

DOCUMENTS RELATING TO OSS ACTIVITY  
IN FRENCH INDOCHINA

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FILE SUBJ.  
DATE SUB-CAT.  
*V. Mandy*

286

MLB-2739-B

A F F I D A V I T

Before me the undersigned authority duly empowered to take acknowledgements, appeared Captain HERBERT J. BLUECHEL, O-286819, known to me to be the person whose name is subscribed below, and having been by me first duly sworn, did on oath without fear or compulsion, state as follows:

This is an account of the events subsequent to and following the killing of A. PETER DEWEY, Major, AC, O-911947<sup>6</sup>.

All events detailed herein transpired on Wednesday, 26 September 1945. In accordance with arrangements previously made, Major DEWEY was scheduled to depart Saigon for Calcutta, India, and subsequently Kandy, Ceylon, via ATC. A radio message had been received on the afternoon of 25 September informing us of the expected arrival of an ATC plane in Saigon at approximately 09:30 hours 26 September. Accordingly Major DEWEY made all necessary preparations to depart on that plane, and on the morning of 26 September I drove him to the air-port in our Jeep, following the route marked "A" on the accompanying sketch. We departed OSS headquarters at approximately 09:00 and arrived at the air-port at approximately 09:10. There we contacted Major FRANK H. RHODES, AC, O-404879, commanding ATC personnel stationed in Saigon. He informed us he had not received news of the plane as yet, but expected it to arrive before noon. I then drove Major DEWEY to the Continental Hotel, Saigon, following the route marked "B" on accompanying sketch, where we picked up his luggage. Major DEWEY had at his disposal a room in the Hotel where he conducted considerable OSS business, and where he also kept considerable of his personal equipment. We returned to the air-port following route "B" arriving at approximately 10:30. At about 11:00 Major DEWEY discovered he had left his dog tags at the Hotel, and I drove him to the Continental to recover same. During the course of this trip we were informed Captain JOSEPH R. COOLIDGE, AC, O-854932, a member of the OSS Mission, had been brought in from Dalat in a rather serious condition from wounds received in a fight with armed annamites. (See separate report for full details). We saw Capt. COOLIDGE at the British 75th Field Ambulance Hospital, and after Major DEWEY had assured himself that Capt. COOLIDGE was receiving adequate medical attention, we returned to the air-port following route "B", arriving at approximately 12:15.

During the course of these trips between the air-port, OSS headquarters, and Saigon, we encountered several annamese constructed road blocks, locations of which are marked on accompanying sketch. At none of these road blocks did we see displayed any arms or any annamese bearing arms. At all road blocks encountered, there were usually present 3 or 4 annamese, but in all instances these people were unarmed and offered no resistance to our passing. This is particularly true of the road block No. 1, which is the point at which Major DEWEY was killed, and is also the road block through which we passed on our initial trip to the air-port at 09:00. At that time we encountered no resistance of any kind, and passed through the block without incident. As was usual, there were several armed annamese loitering within the immediate vicinity, but no arms were observed by either of us. This particular road block (No. 1) had been in existence since Sunday, 23 September 1945, and all members of OSS had passed through

it a great many times during the course of the week. At no time was any resistance encountered by any OSS member.

It will be noted from the sketch map that route "A" is the shortest route to the air-port from OSS headquarters, and for that reason was followed considerably when any OSS member travelled to or from the air-port, even though it was a back road and in poor condition. Route "C", as marked on the sketch map, is the most direct route to Saigon; however, it passes through a thickly populated annamite village, and at various times prior to Sunday 23 September, and at practically all times after that date, the route was blocked by a series of at least 20 road blocks, and to by-pass these caused a considerable loss of time. Therefore, it was our custom to take route "A" to the air-port, and from there route "B" into Saigon, we having decided this to be the safest and easiest route to follow.

At 12:25 Major DEWEY decided we would have time to return to OSS headquarters for lunch, and arranged with the ATC personnel that in event the plane should arrive during our absence, its departure would be delayed until Major DEWEY had returned to the field. Accordingly, we left the air-port in the Jeep, and for the first time that day, Major DEWEY was driving. He was armed with a cal .45 Colt automatic pistol, and a cal .30 carbine, M-1. I was armed with one cal .45 Colt automatic pistol, including 3 clips of ammunition totalling 21 rounds. We followed route "A", and as we approached road block No. 1, I did not see or notice anything unusual. There were several unarmed annamese loitering around as usual, and nothing appeared to have been changed or altered since our initial trip at 09:00. From the accompanying sketch it will be noted that it was a staggered block, necessitating an "S" maneuver on the part of the Jeep to negotiate. The block itself was constructed of tree limbs and brush, and in itself was not formidable in any sense of the word. However, it was necessary to slow down when passing through, and when the action took place the Jeep was travelling approximately 8 miles per hour. This is an estimate.

Major DEWEY was talking to me about the unfortunate experience suffered by Capt. COOLIDGE and he was quite upset about the incident. The Jeep was in the position of traversing the curved portion of the "S", and thus was travelling at an angle to the main course of the road. At that moment, a hidden light machine gun opened fire at point blank range. The gun was mounted in the ditch on the East side of the road and had been camouflaged with brush. At the time the burst was fired, I was looking at Major DEWEY to better hear what he was saying, and saw out of the corner of my eye the position of the machine gun as revealed by the firing. The bullets struck Major DEWEY on the left side of the head slightly to the rear near the left ear. I think one bullet shot off a portion of his lower jaw, although I'm not too certain of this. Blood gushed in all directions, and I am certain Major DEWEY met instant death. None of the bullets struck me, nor did any of them pierce the windshield that I noticed. It is safe to assume that all shots fired entered Major DEWEY's body. This occurred at approximately 12:30.

I certify that neither Major DEWEY nor myself did anything to provoke the incident, and that no warning was given by the annamese prior to the opening of fire. I do not know the type of machine gun, but will certify that it was an automatic weapon as was evident from the rate of fire heard

The Jeep continued on its angle course, and upon reaching the ditch on the West side of the road, rolled over on its right side. The up-turned chassis afforded me protection from subsequent firing of the machine gun. Major DEWEY's body caught on the steering wheel and remained in the Jeep. I did not have the time to examine the body carefully, but from the external condition of the head and the amount of blood flowing from the several wounds, I felt positive he was dead at that time, and will so certify. At no time after the shots were fired did he utter a sound, and even though I remained alongside the Jeep for a period of three or four minutes, I did not observe him to make a move of any kind. Before leaving the scene of the killing, I took a last look at the body to be certain that there was nothing I could do for him.

At the point where the Jeep turned over is a thick hedge, being approximately 3 feet thick and 6 or 7 feet high. This afforded me protection from the annamese across the road who were firing rifles in my direction. I grabbed the carbine and attempted to shoot at several annamese who were approaching me and firing rifles. Their route of approach was along route "D" as marked on the sketch. The carbine jammed and I was forced to abandon it and depend on my pistol. I was fortunate in inflicting three hits on the annamese approaching along route "D", causing the remaining to take cover. I noticed approximately 10, although I did not take time to count. Looking through the hedge I noticed 10 or 15 annamites making their way south on the road in the direction of the OSS headquarters, and realized they were attempting to cut me off from my only line of retreat. I fired several shots at them causing them to take cover. At this point I crawled under the Jeep in order to take a last look at Major DEWEY's body, and was satisfied I could do nothing for him and was certain he was dead. I then made my way down the hedge in the direction of the OSS headquarters, employing fire and movement tactics. The hedge extends approximately 100 yards, and the OSS house is approximately 500 yards from the scene of the initial shooting. I reached the end of the hedge without being hit, and can certify that I did hit five of the pursuing annamese. The stretch of ground bordering the West side of the road constitutes the Saigon Golf Course. The ground is level and flat, and the area from the end of the hedge to the OSS headquarters is devoid of any cover that could be used as protection from rifle fire. Since the pursuing annamese were closing in on me I had no choice but to make a run for it. This I did, during the course of which a great fusillade of shots were fired at me but none found their target. I reached OSS headquarters and immediately alerted all personnel to defend against the expected annamese attack. During the action just described I had expended 18 of my 21 rounds of ammunition.

Present in the OSS headquarters at the time of my arrival, which was at approximately 12:45, were the following:

Capt. FRANK M. WHITE, Inf., O-1017547

T/5 GEORGE WICKES, DEMIL, 32938637

Major FRANCOIS VERGER, French Army, attached to E Group, Saigon Control Commission.

Mr. JAMES McCLINCY, American War Correspondent

Mr. WILLIAM DOWNS, " " "

The last three persons listed had been invited to lunch by Capt. WHITE.

These I placed at strategic places in and around the house and ordered them to fire at any armed annamese they saw firing at or approaching the house. I roamed from point to point in the house and assisted in stopping the attack of the annamese. Our arms consisted of five cal .30 carbines, M-1, and assorted pistols including three cal. 32's, three cal. 38's, and five cal. 45 automatics.

For the next 20 or 30 minutes firing was brisk, and we inflicted many hits on the annamese who had deployed themselves on the golf course which extends to the front of the headquarters. I would estimate the attacking force to number approximately 50. the golf course having become untenable, the annamese moved to the North, East and South sides of the house firing from under the cover of the heavy bushes and hedges that surround the house. From this time on firing was very intermittent.

At approximately 13:30, 1st Lt. LESLIE S. FROST, SC, O-550711, and 2nd Lt. HERBERT W. VARNER, MP, O-1799401, both members OSS, appeared on the scene, having driven to the house from the air-port following route "A". See accompanying reports submitted by both officers. They were accompanied by: Sgt. GERALD E. BOHN 37319392, Pvt. LYMAN C. HANNA 34334086, members of the ATC detachment stationed in Saigon. All were extremely fortunate in reaching the headquarters without being fired on since they had to traverse the road block at which Major DEWEY was killed. Fortunately they arrived during a lull in the shooting. Both officers reported the Jeep to be in the position as when I left it. Lt. VARNER took up a defensive position. Lt. FROST being our radio operator, I ordered to immediately contact our headquarters at Kandy, Ceylon. This he subsequently did, and I kept them informed of what was transpiring. Our telephone lines had been cut so I radioed to Kandy asking them to contact the British radio station at the Gardens, with the request that they in turn contact the Control Commission in Saigon and notify them of our position. I later learned that this had been accomplished, although word had already reached British Headquarters in a manner which will be subsequently described.

At approximately 13:15 a machine gun opened fire from our right front and it is presumed that this was the same gun that killed Major DEWEY. Although the gun fired several bursts, no hits were sustained. This was the only time the gun fired, and since it was not seen after the cessation of hostilities, it is presumed it was removed to a hidden place for safe keeping. At approximately 13:35 I ordered Capt. WHITE to place the Japanese guards at strategic places in and around the house. There were 9 in all, and their primary duty had been to guard the house on a 24-hour schedule. This Capt. WHITE did to my satisfaction, although I must report the Japanese did not take any part in the fighting until approximately 15:10 when one Japanese, who had been stationed on the roof, fired 2 shots into a thick clump of bushes boarding the house on the North side.

By 15:00 firing had ceased and the annamites had been forced to retire because of the accuracy of our fire. At about 15:10 they raised a Red Cross flag and approached the golf course to our front to evacuate their dead and wounded. At this point Capt. GOSLEN, British Army, walked into our house, having come from his quarters about 150 yards to the South. He had heard the firing but was not aware we had been attacked. At this moment the two war correspondents, McCLINCY and DOWNS, asked permission to proceed to the air-port in order to notify British Headquarters of our

situation and to request aid. There is on the golf course a concrete drainage ditch, 4 feet wide and 5 feet deep which terminates in the vicinity of the air-port. See accompanying sketch. I granted them permission to go and instructed them to proceed down this ditch which would give them good protection in case they were attacked. A visual reconnaissance from the roof of our house revealed that there were no annamites visible along the line of their route, and they took off. They had with them two Cal. ~~38 Smiths~~ and 100 rounds of ammunition. They subsequently reached the air-port without incident and contacted Major RHODES who in turn notified British Headquarters. For details of subsequent events, see report as submitted by Major RHODES, attached.

At about 15:10, a truck filled with Japanese working party was observed passing down the road North in front of the house. Capt. WHITE requested permission to stop them and have them accompany him to recover the body of Major DEWEY. This permission I granted after ascertaining that the area around our headquarters was comparatively safe and free of armed annamites. For details of this mission see report attached as written by Capt. WHITE.

I remained at headquarters during all this time in order to maintain command of the situation and to maintain control of the radio contact which had been established with our headquarters in Kandy, Ceylon. I kept our headquarters fully informed of all events as they occurred. I was informed of the negotiations for the recovery of Major DEWEY's body and subsequent results, and upon the arrival of the troop of Gurkhas, I immediately ordered all personnel to gather their personal belongings and to prepare to evacuate the house, since the area could not be adequately defended against a night attack with our limited personnel. We had only one truck available, and this we loaded to the limit with the more important items, including the radio equipment.


We departed OSS house at approximately 17:15 under escort of a portion of the Gurkha troop. Before leaving I instructed the Japanese guard to maintain their guard posts. We arrived at the Hotel Continental at 17:40, where we established ourselves in suitable quarters.

At 18:00 I paid a visit to Colonel CEDILLE and informed him of the events just described, and appraised him of the facts concerning Major DEWEY's body. He personally wanted to see Gen. GRACEY and word reached me shortly thereafter that they had personally ordered all forces under their command to conduct a complete search for his body.

I cannot speak too highly of the personnel present during the above described action. My orders were carried out explicitly and accurately, and all reflected the true spirit and training of the U. S. Army. Captain WHITE and T/5 WICKES are especially to be commended: Capt. WHITE for the way in which he executed my several orders to him, and for his courage in volunteering for the task of proceeding down the road to recover the body

of Major DEWEY, he having volunteered in spite of the fact that a considerable number of armed annamese were still within the immediate vicinity. T/5 GEORGE WICKES for the personal courage displayed in meeting the initial onslaught of the attacking force, and for his subsequent actions and extreme cooperation during the balance of the action.


It is the spirit and courage of such men that have made the United States Army the formidable striking force that it is to-day.

  
HERBERT J. BLUECHEL  
Capt., GAC.  
O-286819.

Further affiant sayeth not, wherefore witness my hand and seal of office this 13<sup>th</sup> day of October 1945.

~~My commission expires.~~

*Saigon, French Indo-China*

  
~~Signature of Notary Public~~

*Major, AGP  
Asst Adjutant  
HQ OSS 1BT*

Witnesses;-

1) \_\_\_\_\_

2) \_\_\_\_\_

A F F I D A V I T

Before me the undersigned authority duly empowered to take acknowledgements, appeared Captain FRANK M. WHITE Jr., O-1017547, known to me to be the person whose name is subscribed below, and having been by me first duly sworn, did on oath without fear or compulsion, state as follows:

After having obtained proper clearance from the Mission Executive Officer, I invited three persons to our headquarters for luncheon. They were Major FRANCOIS VERGER, a French officer attached to the Allied Control Commission, Mr. JAMES McCLINCY and Mr. WILLIAM DOWNS, both American war correspondents. I picked them up at the Continental Hotel at 12:15 and we proceeded immediately to the headquarters house via Rue Paul Blanchy. We progressed without incident through numerous road blocks until we reached the turnabout labeled Point 2 (See attached sketch). There we heard general firing in the immediate vicinity and we noted several burning buildings. We were told by an officer of the British Army who approached our car that the trouble was not serious and that the Gurkha troops with him had the situation in hand.

The remaining mile of the trip from the turnabout to the OSS headquarters was made without incident.

Almost immediately after arriving at the house we began to hear rifle fire. We stepped to the front porch in an effort to locate the riflemen or their target. None of us had any idea at the time that we ourselves were probably the intended targets.

After a few rounds had struck near and around the house, I went to the second floor, entered the arms room and broke out all the carbines we had. I gave one to Lt. WICKS who was in the building at our arrival; a second to Major VERGER; the third to Mr. DOWNS and I kept the last piece for myself.

Only a matter of minutes later Capt. BLUECHEL was sighted coming in through the front gate of the house. As he was covered with blood and stumbling from exhaustion I rushed to the lawn to meet him. TEC-5 WICKS was with me. The others remained in the house. Capt. BLUECHEL told us that Major DEWEY had been killed in an ambush several hundred yards up the road (Point A) and that he had had to fight his way back to the house to save his own life. He ordered us to defend ourselves and the house against the impending attack. The time, although I do not remember referring to my watch, must have been about 12:50.

After hearing Capt. BLUECHEL's news, WICKS and I saw four annamites rushing towards the house from across the golf course. They were armed. WICKS and I commenced fire almost simultaneously. Three of them dropped but the fourth got away, although we believe we hit him.

By this time Major VERGER joined WICKS and I in the yard. We fired at whatever targets presented themselves. Ten minutes or so later we retired to the house itself which afforded better vision. In the meantime, the three Japanese guards who were on duty when Major BLUECHEL returned to the house, stayed at their posts but took no active part in the action.

After regaining the house the entire group disposed themselves at vantage points on the second floor and the roof under direction of Capt. BLUECHEL. Our firing was brisk at this time - there being no scarcity of targets. The annamites were deployed generally in groups of from 5 to 10 per group, several of which could be seen in the golf course off to our right front. Later, probably because of the effective fire being delivered from the house, they began to leave their positions in the golf course and appeared to be attempting to flank the north side of our house. This route of approach would have afforded them much better cover.

Shortly before 13:30 Capt. BLUECHEL instructed me to redispense the Japanese guards. By this time the original three who were at the front gate when hostilities began had increased to six, the new arrivals presumably having come out of the guard house when it became evident to those there that the main house was being attacked.

I stationed four of the six on the flanks and rear of the house where they would be in a better position to deal with attacks from those quarters. One of the Japs was kept in the house with us as reserve and, in the event the outside Japs turned on us, for possible use as a hostage.

Fire at this junction was intermittent. At about 13:30 a truck towing a passenger car approached the house from the North. We recognized the passengers as Lts. VARNER and Frost of our own detachment with two enlisted men of the Air Transport Command. We were naturally surprised to see them as they had had to come through the road block at which Major DEWEY was ambushed.

At 15:10 the annamites raised a Red Cross flag in the golf course across the road. After a conference it was decided to take advantage in the halt in hostilities to send out for aid. DOWNS and McCLINCY, the two war correspondents, volunteered to cross the golf course. They were instructed by Capt. BLUECHEL to keep well to the South of the area held by the annamites, and make for the air-field where they would be able to notify British headquarters by telephone of our situation. This they did. Distance to the air-field being approximately  $1\frac{1}{2}$  to 2 miles.

Within another 10 minutes we sighted a 3-ton Jap truck proceeding South on the road. It was carrying a party of unarmed Japanese sailors. I asked Major BLUECHEL for permission to commandeer the truck and use it in an effort to recover Major DEWEY's body. Permission was granted; and, accompanied by Major VERGER, we ordered the truck to turn around and take us to the site of the killing.

After considerable argument with the Jap NCO who either couldn't understand my orders or was reluctant to return up the road, we forced the Japs to drive us to the barricade. We dismounted and searched around the barricade but discovered that both the Major's body and his Jeep had been carried away.

As VERGER and I were deciding on our next move we noticed further up the road a group of Annamites displaying a Red Cross flag. As we were on an errand of mercy ourselves we determined to try and stop the annamite



aid party and obtain their assistance in recovering the Major's body. This we did and just as we made contact with the annamites we ourselves were joined by Major FRANK RHOADS, USAAF. In his jeep Major RHOADS had with him a Sanitary Corps Major, one enlisted man of his ATC detachment, and McCLINCY and DOWNS, all of whom he had met at the air-field.

We approached the annamite first aid party in a group. Major VERGER was holding up a carbine with a white handkerchief tied to it. In French I explained to an annamite in charge what I wanted. He told us he would summon the annamite field commander and we agreed on a truce for this purpose.

During the intermission while we waited for the arrival of the annamite leader we had a chance to look about and take stock of the situation. We were able to detect the presence of a considerable group of armed annamites who were under partial cover in the area. We were not, however, able to see any evidence of the machine gun which killed Major DEWEY and which later had been employed against the house.

Within a few minutes the Red Cross man returned with the man who was presented to us as the chief of the annamite field force. He was between thirty and thirty-five years old and wore military boots and breeches. He spoke fair French but no English. Conversation with him was difficult inasmuch as he was in a state of excitement verging on hysteria.

Immediately we explained to him that we were Americans and that we had come seeking the body of Major DEWEY. At first he said he knew nothing of any body but at our insistence he was able to remember an "incident" in which a Colonel had been killed at the barricade.

It was difficult all along to make much sense out of this man, but in the course of the parley we had admissions that his men had shot Colonel DEWEY and that they had fired on our house. However, throughout he stoutly maintained that had he known that the Colonel was an American, he would never have allowed the shots fired. He had attacked the house, he said, because he believed that both French and British officers lived there, even though only an American flag was flown, and because we had killed so many of his men. During the course of the fighting he said we had killed eight annamites. He did not mention the number of wounded he had suffered.

We tried to come immediately to the point but only after some little time were we able to make any arrangements for the recovery of the body. We finally reached the following terms: we would allow him to recover three of his dead from the golf course immediately in front of the OSS house in exchange for which he would produce the body of Colonel DEWEY. We permitted his men to use Major RHOADS' jeep for this purpose.

In the meantime our negotiations were hindered by the two war correspondents, DOWNS and McCLINCY, who had returned with Major RHOADS. The correspondents kept plying the annamite leader with questions which provoked from him lengthy and impassioned speeches on the indignities suffered by the Viet-Minh from the French. He also attacked the British at length, charging that the British, too, desired to "dominate" the annamite people.

Within another 10 minutes the jeep had returned from the golf course with the three annamite dead laid across the hood. We noticed that the equipment on them, including cartridge boxes and canteens was Japanese. Our part of the bargain fulfilled, the annamite chief and a detail was about to depart to bring the Colonel's body to us. Whether he would have eventually carried out his pledge is impossible to say.

At the moment of his departure firing broke out anew, this time coming from the vicinity of Point 2. We were able to see immediately that the shooting was coming from a party of Gurkhas (later identified as two platoons of the 31st Gurkha Rifles). They were coming up the road towards us and were stampeding a large number of non-combattant annamites ahead of them.

Gur position then - being in annamite hands with Gurkhas coming towards us - began to become awkward. This situation was further complicated by the two war correspondents. Apparently being unfamiliar with the disposition of Gurkha troops during combat, the two correspondents attempted to halt the oncoming troops in order to spare the non-combattant annamites caught between the lines.

On agreement with Major RHOADS I broke off my negotiations with the annamites in an effort to try and prevent trouble between DOWNS and McCLINCY and the British Major commanding the Gurkhas. I was unsuccessful. The correspondents demanded that the Gurkhas retire while the civilians were cleared from the area. The Major refused. He told them his orders were to restore order "by the use of maximum force" and that was what he intended to do. The correspondents charged him with being a "murderer" if he continued. I finally managed to convince the correspondents that they were wasting their own and everyone else's time and they returned to OSS headquarters with me. Upon my return to the house I reported briefly what had happened to Capt. BLUECHEL. At approximately 17:00 we evacuated the OSS headquarters, moving to the Continental Hotel.

*Frank M. White Jr.*  
FRANK M. WHITE JR.,  
Capt. Inf.,  
O-1017547

Further affiant sayeth not, wherefore witness my hand and seal of office this 13<sup>th</sup> day of October 1945.  
~~My commission expires~~

Saigon, French Indo-China

*Francis M. Amall*  
Signature - Notary Public  
Major, AWD  
Asst. Adjutant  
HQ OSS + BT

Witnesses:-

- 1) \_\_\_\_\_
- 2) \_\_\_\_\_

STRATEGIC SERVICES UNIT  
WAR DEPARTMENT  
APO 432

25 October 1945

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Investigation of Death of Major Peter Dewey

TO : STRATEGIC SERVICES OFFICER, IBT

1. The investigation of the death of Major Dewey and the affidavits secured pertinent thereto by Captain Bluechel have been reviewed by the undersigned and are believed to constitute a very thorough and workman-like job. The reports are relatively dispassionate and under the circumstances reflect as close an approximation of the truth as would be possible. In any case, Captain Bluechel is obviously the most informed and logical source of information.

2. From my own observation and study, the general situation in Saigon reflects an intense desire on the part of the Annamese for independence and thorough hatred by them of the French and any other white people who happen to be in any way supporting or sympathizing with the French. It is true that they may be relatively more favorably disposed toward the Americans, but it should be borne in mind that the average Annamese thinks in terms of "white" people, and makes very little distinction between European and American. The hatred of the Annamese for the French has been brought about by the not too enlightened policy of the French, which has been to exploit the Annamese to the greatest degree possible and treat them more or less with contempt. To my observation, the French made a lot of money out of the Japanese occupation and are most anxious to have someone control the Annamese. The Annamese naturally greatly resent the British protection of French interests and inasmuch as the American military in Saigon regularly attend British staff meetings, it is quite likely that the Annamese infer that the United States tacitly approves the British policy.

3. The overt British attitude is to disarm the Japanese, send them home, and get out as soon as possible. If in actual fact this is done, it is doubted if the French will be able to control the situation.

4. With specific reference to the death of Major Dewey, in my judgment there is no question but that he was killed by the Annamese, and it is highly unlikely that the Annamese had any idea of his

identity at the time he was shot. There is some question in my mind as to whether it would have made a great deal of difference had he been flying an American flag. The road block and the machine gun emplacement appear to have been arranged with the intention of shooting at the next white man that came by. It is possible even that the objective was to secure a jeep and such arms and ammunition as might be in the jeep. On the other hand, it is clear that there was no possible way for the Annamese to distinguish the occupants of the jeep from French other than that it is the British and Americans who drive jeeps in the Saigon area.

5. It appears that General Gracey is not well suited to his assignment. He seems to have adopted a notably bull-like attitude toward the Annamese calculating that this would cow them. In the light of later experience, he should have realized that in their overly emotional state, they would react violently towards his bluffs. It also is apparent that he had no need to bluff, but could have waited until adequate forces were at his disposal. His blunderings with the French POW's was most ill advised, and there is substantial reason for believing that his mishandling of his own assignment was the greatest single immediate contribution to the intensification of Annamese animosity toward all whites in Saigon, and thus indirectly contributed toward Major Dewey's death. Further, it is apparent that in issuing his orders that no flags would be flown by anyone other than himself, he was thinking too much in terms of his own personal prestige rather than in terms of the safety of his own and American officers.

6. There is no way of securing any direct corroboration or denial of the British statement that Major Dewey told Lt. Colonel Cass he was "satisfied with the safety of his establishment." It is obvious, however, that the British were completely satisfied with even less protection at ISLD Hq across and down the road from the OSS Hq, and only in the light of later developments would the issue take on importance. Gracey very probably grossly underestimated the danger.

7. It seems appropriate to mention here that Captain Bluechel was doing an outstanding intelligence job in Saigon. There was almost a constant flow of visitors to his quarters, including top ranking Japanese, British and French officials, many French civilians of importance, and he was also, until General Gracey made the situation too difficult, in touch with leading Annamese. With regard to these last, however, it is apparent that the political leaders of the Annamese were unable to control them and consequently scant reliance should be placed on their commitments. Also Captain Bluechel

is most deserving of commendation for the type of leadership he displayed. It was obvious that he commanded the respect and confidence of those serving under him, as well as the officers with whom he conducted liaison activities.

8. As a further gratuitous comment, it is unlikely in my opinion that military personnel will in the future be in a position to secure much valuable intelligence from French Indo-China. As soon as the situation reaches a point where elements of danger are in control, they should be replaced by civilian personnel operating under the cover of newspaper correspondents or others having legitimate business in the area.

F. M. SMALL  
Major, AGD

(Dictated but not read.)

SKETCH MAP showing position,  
and routes leading to position,  
where Lt Col DEWEY, US Army,  
met his death.

